



Report into the Grounding of fishing vessel

'An Fong 168'

Stanley Harbour, Falkland Islands
5th February 2025



NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, in pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purpose is to attribute or apportion liability of blame.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

PSC	Port State Control
FIMA	Falkland Islands Maritime Authority
Kts	Knots
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
VHF	Very High Frequency Radio
Ch	Channel
SH	Stanley Harbour
MPC	Mount Pleasant Complex
Met	Meteorological
Z	Zulu
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
JCRO	Joint Control Room Operator
RFIP	Royal Falkland Islands Police
AHM	Assistant Harbour Master
HM	Harbour Master
HoMA	Head of Maritime Authority
CRO	Chief Resilience Officer
JOC	Joint Operations Center
SO2	Staff Officer 2
ECMP	East Cove Military Port
m	Metres
DHM	Deputy Harbour Master
OSC	On Scene Coordinator
FIPASS	Falklands Interim Port and Storage System
GMDSS	Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
DSC	Digital Selective Calling

RT	Radio Telephony
AIS	Automatic Information System
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles
BFSAI	British Forces South Atlantic Islands

SUMMARY

On the early evening of 5th February 2025, the *An Fong 168* started to heave on her anchor to leave Stanley Harbour and to relocate in Port William following a Port State Control (PSC) inspection by the Falkland Islands Maritime Authority (FIMA) during which numerous deficiencies had been issued to the vessel, resulting in its detention.

The wind was 30 Knots (Kts) from the North and shortly after heaving anchor, the vessel started to swing to the South and ran aground close to the wreck of the *Charles Cooper* on the south shore of Stanley Harbour.

Harbour launches assisted in the refloating of the vessel, which was initially successful, however the fishing vessel's propellor became fouled by a line and the vessel again drifted aground further East of her initial grounding position.

The *An Fong 168* was in Stanley Harbour along with seven other fishing vessels to conduct a pre-license inspection prior to starting the fishing season in the waters around the Falkland Islands.

SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 PARTICULARS OF AN FONG 168

Ship Particulars	
Vessel name	An Fong 168
Flag	Taiwan
Callsign	BL2226
Classification Society	Not classed, but inspected by CR
IMO Number	9799575
Type	Squid Jigger – Fishing Vessel
Registered owner	An Fong Lian Shin Fishery Co Ltd
Construction	Steel
Year of build	2015
Length overall (metres)	65.80
Breadth (Metres)	11
Gross tonnage	1193
VOYAGE PARTICULARS	
Last port of Departure	Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Voyage Status	Leaving anchor in Stanley Harbour, Falkland Islands to proceed to anchorage in Port William, Falkland Islands
Cargo information	Partial – Frozen Squid
Minimum Safe Manning	10
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION	
Date and Time	5 th February 2025 at 1839 (UTC-3)
Type of Marine Casualty	Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident	Stanley Harbour, Falkland Islands
Injuries	None
Damage / environmental impact	Minimal
External & Internal environment	Wind northerly 30kts, Clear, 14°C - 16°C Swell neg, within harbour limits
Persons on board	41



An Fong 168, Photo courtesy of the Falkland Islands Maritime Authority

1.2 NARRATIVE

1.2.1 Initial Grounding



1015 Local time (UTC -3) on the morning of 5th February 2025, *An Fong 168* crossed the Port William reporting line, after her sea passage from Kaohsiung, Taiwan and passed her entry information to Stanley Port Control¹ by Very High Frequency (VHF) radio on Channel (Ch) 10. The vessel then proceeded to her allocated anchorage at Stanley Harbour (SH) 3 and let go her Starboard anchor to 4 shackles² in the water. At the time of her arrival at the anchorage, Stanley Harbour had seven other jiggers who had already been at anchor since around 0700 that morning (**Figure 1**).

1100 The vessel was anchored at SH3, the wind at the time was around 30Kts² as forecast earlier in the day by the Mount Pleasant Complex³ (MPC) Meteorological (Met) office (**Figure 2**). There was a strong wind warning for Stanley Harbour (**Figure 3**) in place valid from 2000Z⁴ (1700 Local) on 5th February to 0400Z (0100 Local) on 6th February.

1210 Two inspectors from FIMA boarded the vessel to carry out a Port State Control (PSC) inspection⁵ which had been previously planned. The inspection highlighted a number of deficiencies and FIMA had detained the vessel. The propulsion of the vessel was not reported as defective and during the inspection the steering gear was tested and found to be in good order. During the inspection, the master of the vessel was taken ashore as part of his licensing briefing and returned to the vessel before the PSC officers left the vessel.

1700 PSC officers left the vessel.

¹ Stanley Port Control is the radio call sign for the Falkland Islands Maritime Authority during office hours (0800 – 1630) or the Joint Control Room outside of office hours (1630 – 0800)

² Knots – Measurement mariners use to determine the velocity of a ship, wind and tide in nautical miles. One knot is equal to one nautical mile per hour of 1.852 kilometres per hour.

³ Mount Pleasant Complex is a base operated by the Ministry of Defence in the Falkland Islands

⁴ Zulu – The same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) or Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)

⁵ Port State Control Inspection is an inspection carried out by the Falkland Islands Maritime Authority to ensure that the vessel is compliant with International regulations.

1830 *An Fong 168* starts to heave on the starboard anchor. At this time the rudder was amidships and the bow thruster was not being used. The master moved the engine control lever to minimum ahead for 3.5 seconds and returned the lever back to the zero position. This was done to take the weight off the chain so the anchor could be heaved easily. There was two-way communication between the master and the officer on the forecastle who was reporting how many shackles⁶ of anchor chain were in the water. The master noticed the bow starting to move to port when 3 shackles were in the water. The cable at this time was leading 45 degrees to port at a long stay⁷. The vessel was now making a southerly course over the ground with a westerly heading. The vessel continued to heave up the anchor, but the master was reluctant to use the engines at this time because the anchor was still out.

When the anchor was fully recovered, the master was aware that the vessel was rapidly drifting to the south shore, he applied starboard helm but stated this had no effect to the vessels heading, he then applied port helm to try and turn the vessel through 180° before the vessel grounded on the south bank of Stanley Harbour (**Figure 4**).

1839 Vessel aground. On-board Closed-Circuit Television cameras (CCTV) show that the vessel came to rest close to the wreck of the Charles Cooper⁸ 9 minutes after the master identified that the heading of the vessel was moving when heaving up the anchor. The Master of the *An Fong 168* called the local representative in Stanley to inform them of the situation. The master continued to run the engine using astern propulsion in the hope that he could free the vessel, but this had no effect.

⁶ Shackle – A measurement of anchor chain used on a ship. 1 Shackle equals 27.5m (90 feet) .

⁷ Long Stay – A descriptive word used to report that the anchor chain is taught and at a shallow angle entering the water.

⁸ Charles Cooper - An 1886 historic shipwreck




Figure 1: Stanley Harbour anchorages overview



Forecast for Stanley Harbour

Forecast issued on 05 February 2025 at 07:34 Z

All times are in Zulu (UTC)

Detailed forecast for today and tonight	
05 February 2025	
Wind Direction / Speed in knots (Beaufort)	
09 – 15Z	NW 10-20 (F3-5) gusting 20-25 becoming N 15-20 (F4-5) gusting 25-30 from 14Z.
15 – 21Z	N 15-20 (F4-5) gusting 25-30 increasing to 20-30 (F5-7) gusting 30-40 with isolated gusts up to 45 from 17Z
21 – 03Z	N 20-30 (F5-7) gusting 30-40 with isolated gusts up to 45
Confidence (Wind)	High
Weather (Visibility)	
Fair (good) with a risk of rain and showers (moderate) from 20Z and a low risk of a thunderstorm (moderate to poor)	
Pressure Tendency	Falling slowly until 15Z then falling

Wind Direction / Speed in knots (Beaufort)	
03 – 09Z	N 20-30 (F5-7) gusting 30-40 with isolated gusts up to 45 easing to 15-20 (F4-5) gusting 25-35 from 04Z then easing to 10-15 (F3-4) from 08Z
Confidence (Wind)	High
Weather (Visibility)	
Fair (good) with a risk of rain and showers (moderate) and a low risk of a thunderstorm (moderate to poor)	

Outlook for the remainder of tomorrow	
Wind Direction / Speed in knots (Beaufort)	
09 – 18Z	N 10-15 (F3-4) backing W from 12Z then increasing to 15-20 (F4-5) gusting 25-35 from 16Z
Confidence (Wind)	Moderate
Weather (Visibility)	
Fair (good) with a risk of rain (moderate)	

NOTES: This forecast is not subject to amendment, but will be supplemented by an update during periods of increased harbour activity and a warning service.
Warning issued when the mean wind speed is expected to reach or exceed 30KT.

Figure 2: Stanley Harbour Weather forecast - issued by MPC Met Office

Strong Wind (30 KT) Warning for Stanley

Attn :

Stanley Harbour

Issued at :

Wed 5 Feb 0717Z

2025

Validity :

052000Z to

060400Z

Warning text :

The N surface winds may increase to mean 25-34 KT gust 35-40 KT, isolated gust 40-45 KT during the warning period.

This warning is issued when the mean wind speed is expected to be greater than or equal to 30 KT.



Issued by: Met Office, Falklands/MPA

Tel: 94130 3575

Figure 3: Strong weather warning for Stanley Harbour - issued by MPA Met Office




Figure 4: Positioning of An Fong 168 prior to grounding (NOT TO SCAL)

1.2.1 Events in the Joint Control Room

At approximately 1835, an off-duty control room operator who was on their way to the Police station for a training session noticed that there was a jigger very close to the shoreline and they reported this to the on-duty Joint Control Room⁹ Operator (JCRO). The duty JCRO went outside to the front of the police station confirmed that the vessel was close to the shore and possibly aground. They then returned to the control room and called the duty Assistant Harbour Master (AHM).

At 1850 a Police officer radioed the JCR to ask for additional officers to assist with traffic that was now building on the road. At 1856 it was reported to the JCR that the Royal Falkland Islands Police (RFIP) had closed the main road due to the increase in traffic.

At 2134 the JCRO received a request from FIMA to clear all vehicles from the Capstan car park. At 2136 RFIP had confirmed that all vehicles had left the car park apart from one for which the owner could not be located. The Harbour Master (HM) and Deputy Harbour Master (DHM) left the car park but requested that officers remain on location in case the vessel started to drift again.

Between 2210 and 2214 FIMA contacted the JCR to inform them that RFIP were no longer required at the scene and FIMA officers would monitor the vessel on an hourly basis.

1.2.2 Events in the FIMA Ops Room

Wednesday 5th February 2025

At 1835 the duty AHM received a call from the JCR advising that there was a jigger close to the shore. The AHM made his way to the office and by 1843 had called the HM, Head of Maritime Authority (HoMA), the Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), the Fisheries Department, and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

At 1848 the Staff Officer 2 Maritime (SO2 Maritime) of the JOC called FIMA to discuss the release of tugs at East Cove Military Port (ECMP).

At 1852 FIMA contacted Sullivan Shipping launch company and requested all available launches to proceed to the jigger to assist with refloating the vessel. The tides were assessed and found to be at 0.8meters (m) on a rising tide with high tide expected to be 1.5m at 2347 (**Figure 5**).

At 1857 the HM telephoned the DHM and asked her to remain on the launch 'John Byron' as On Scene Coordinator (OSC). The weather conditions at this time were reported to be northerly 24 Knots (Kts) gusting 32 Kts.

At 1900 it was reported that the OSC was on scene and would coordinate with the launch vessels to establish a tow and to attempt to refloat the vessel.

⁹ Joint Control Room – a room at the Royal Falkland Islands Police station that handle all emergency traffic including Maritime radios outside of government office hours (1630 – 0800).

At 2008 the OSC reported that a tow line had been established between the jigger and a local launch. The AHM was positioned to observe the starboard side of the vessel and the DHM was positioned to observe the port side of the vessel.

At 2045, it was reported by the OSC that the vessel was now afloat and was moving astern with the assistance of the launch. The intention was to pull the jigger by the stern clear into the middle of the harbour.

At 2102 it was reported that the jigger had lost propulsion due to a fouled propeller caused by the tow line being pulled onto/around the propeller. The vessel was drifting towards the public jetty.

At 2110, it was reported that the vessel was aground by the public jetty with its bow facing west.

Throughout the evening FIMA conducted hourly rounds to the public jetty to check on the condition of the vessel and any signs of pollution. FIMA were also able to observe the vessel via a webcam provided by SURE which is positioned on the visitor's jetty centre which gave a clear image of the grounded vessel (**Figure 6**)

1.2.3 Events on Scene Pre-Grounding

At 1830 the master gave the order to start heaving on the starboard anchor. The vessel was laying on a northerly heading with the starboard anchor chain leading 45°. The wind was from the North at 30Kts to take some of the weight off the anchor chain, the master moved the engine control lever to ahead for approximately 3.5 seconds and then returned it to the zero position. This moved the vessel forward into the wind which caused the anchor chain to slacken off so it could be heaved easily.

Communication to the bridge and mooring station was via a talk back system.

As the vessel started to heave the anchor, the wind swung the vessel to a westerly heading placing the wind on the starboard beam. The vessel continued to heave the anchor and the master stated that he applied starboard helm with the engine ahead to try to move the vessel to starboard to place the bow into the wind, but this had little effect, so the master applied port helm to turn the vessel to the South with the intending of completing a 180° turn to port.

As the anchor continued to be retrieved the vessel gained momentum in a southerly direction as a result of the wind and the engines moving ahead with port helm applied. At approximately 1838, the vessel passed over the 5m depth contour on a SSW heading bringing the vessel into shallow waters. The vessel was unable to complete its turn and ran aground on the wreck of the Charles Cooper. CCTV footage from the vessel shows the heading of the vessel prior to the grounding (**Figures 7,8 & 9**)




Figure 5: Extract from Admiralty Total Tides, showing Height of tide at the time of the grounding.



Figure 6: Web cam footage from the SURE web cam on the visitor's jetty center.



Figure 7: CCTV Footage looking forward with the vessel's heading approximately south westerly



Figure 8: CCTV Footage looking forward with the vessel's heading approximately south, south easterly



Figure 9: CCTV Footage looking forward with the vessel aground

1.2.4 Events on Scene Post-Grounding

Motor launch *Fitzroy*, operated by Sullivan Shipping, was on its way back to Falklands Interim Port and Storage System (FIPASS) after picking up the Chief Surveyor and DHM from another vessel following a Port State Control Inspection. The coxswain on *Fitzroy* received a notification on his phone from a social media site showing that there was a vessel aground in Stanley Harbour. The *Fitzroy* then proceeded to the area where the vessel was aground for a check on the vessel before proceeding to FIPASS to drop off the Chief Surveyor at FIPASS and then to return to the site of the grounding with the DHM.

The *Fitzroy* went to the Public Jetty to pick up the Taiwanese translator and a company representative before returning to the site of the grounding. The DHM onboard the *Fitzroy* was declared as the OSC by FIMA.

Once communications had been established through the translator on *Fitzroy* to the master of the *An Fong 168*, it was agreed that the *Fitzroy* would attempt to pull the *An Fong 168* away from the shore. A mooring line from the stern of the *An Fong 168* was passed to the *Fitzroy* and secured. The *Fitzroy* then ran her engines astern in an attempt to pull the *An Fong 168* free from her grounded position. After approximately five minutes, the *Fitzroy* took way off her engines and waited another twenty minutes for a second attempt. This was to allow time for the tide to rise further to assist with refloating.

On the second attempt, with the *An Fong 168*'s engines going astern and the pull from the *Fitzroy*, the *An Fong 168* came free and was pulled away from the shore by the *Fitzroy* into the wind so that the *An Fong 168*'s heading was facing South. When the *An Fong 168* was pulled into deeper water the coxswain from the *Fitzroy* then asked the translator to advise the master of the *An Fong 168* that the launch would be releasing the tow line and for him to stop propulsion while the tow line was released. The master acknowledged this and when this acknowledgement was passed on to the Coxswain from the translator, the Coxswain gave the order to release the tow line.

The *Fitzroy* released the line attached to the *An Fong 168* and started to back away in to clear water and away from the vessel. When the tow line was released from the *Fitzroy* it started to sink beneath the surface. The crew from the *An Fong 168* started to heave the line and were unaware that the line had sunk. The master engaged astern propulsion to move his vessel further astern, this action caused the remaining tow line in the water to be pulled towards the propellor which caused the propellor to become fouled.

The Master of the *An Fong 168* became aware of the fouled propellor when this was reported to him by a crew member on the aft mooring station. With the vessel disabled, it drifted bodily towards the head of the Public jetty, No attempt was made to drop the anchor from the *An Fong 168* as it was deemed this would have little affect and would have caused the stern to swing to the South possibly causing damage to the propellor and rudder.

The *Fiztroy* stayed clear of the *An Fong 168* as it drifted to the shoreline given that there was little time to establish a new line and the risks associated with attaching a line to the jigger.

1.2.4 Post Grounding Events

During the evening, FIMA maintained hourly patrols of the grounded vessel by visiting the grounding site and monitoring the list of the vessel. FIMA were also able to monitor the vessel by a remote webcam provided by the telecommunications company SURE, which is a public webcam fitted to the north side of the Visitors' Jetty centre with a refresh rate of 20 seconds.

The next day the HM, FIMA Chief Surveyor & Chief Pilot attended a planning meeting to discuss the plan to refloat the vessel with the tug, local operator and British Forces South Atlantic Islands (BFSAI) representatives. Later that morning with the assistance of the tug provided by BFSAI, the *An Fong 168* was refloated and anchored in Stanley Harbour under the direction of the HM and Chief Pilot. FIMA carried out a post grounding inspection of the vessel to ascertain if there were any immediate signs of damage and any signs of oil leakage. A more in-depth inspection was carried out by divers once the vessel was alongside a safe berth.

Oil was discovered in the water around the vessel during this inspection, however this was coming from a buildup of oil on the deck of the vessel and not from damage to the underwater structure.

The vessel remained at anchor overnight and was towed to FIPASS at 1030 the next morning to allow an underwater survey to be carried out.

1.2.5 Inspection of Vessel Post Grounding

As ship's agent, Sullivan Shipping requested a dive survey to be conducted of the underwater hull section of the vessel to clear the fouled propeller and to check for further signs of damage.

The inspection found that the propeller was fouled with a number of turns of the polypropylene mooring line used for the tow. This line was wrapped around the propeller shaft with most of the line trailing on the seabed (**figure 10**).



Figure 10: Fouled propeller

The propeller showed signs of heavy damage to the leading edge of the propeller with large pieces missing, metal tearing and bending of the edge of all four blades (**figure11**).



Figure 11: Damaged propeller blade

The rudder was not found to be distorted or misaligned but did show signs of surface abrasion on the lower hinges. The bottom section of the rudder showed signs of significant surface abrasion.

1.3 FIMA OPS ROOM

1.3.1 Ops Room Monitoring Equipment

FIMA's operations room, which is situated within their main office, is manned between the hours of 0800 to 1630 Monday to Friday, all year round. The office is fitted with a Sailor marine band VHF radio which provides radio coverage for Stanley Harbour, Port William and some parts of Berkeley Sound.

The office is also equipped with a Danphone GMDSS island-wide VHF system which has Digital Selective Calling¹⁰ (DSC) capability but at the time of writing this report is still in the commissioning stage and the DSC function is not yet online. The island-wide Radio Telephony (RT) function is not yet at its full capability, but it has a larger range than that of the VHF standalone set. The harbours cannot be seen from within the building housing the Ops Room, nor were there any cameras or harbour radar monitoring the traffic within the harbour at the time of the grounding.

The office is fitted with an Automatic Identification System¹¹ (AIS) unit which receives AIS information that is displayed on electronic navigational charts and also a web browser provided by the local communications company SURE, which provide vessel positions via AIS and which is overlaid on Google maps.

1.3.2 Staffing

FIMA consists of five members of fulltime Staff and one consultant Chief Surveyor:

- The Head of the Maritime Authority
- The Harbour Master
- The Deputy Harbour Master
- Two Assistant Harbour Masters (one AHM was on leave during the grounding)
- Chief Surveyor. Usually based in the UK but was in the Falkland Islands at the time of the grounding.

The staff at FIMA come from a variety of maritime backgrounds, namely, Royal Navy, Merchant Navy, HM Coastguard and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Although the HoMA is not part of the core operational staff, he provides support as required. All members have in date certificates which include Search and Rescue Mission Coordination training provided by HM Coastguard, GMDSS and JESIP¹².

¹⁰ Digital Selective Calling is a method of sending a digitally formatted distress message via radio.

¹¹ Automatic Identification System is an automatic ship tracking system that uses transceivers on ships to broadcast live navigational data to AIS terminals.

¹² JESIP is the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles which is designed to improve the way emergency services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents.

The day-to-day harbour control operated by the AHMs include:

- Recording entry and exits of all vessels crossing the reporting line.
- Allocation of vessels requesting anchorages in Port William or Stanley Harbour.
- Monitoring all traffic transiting in Port William, Stanley Harbour and Berkeley Sound.
- Harbour and shore patrols.
- Broadcasts of weather, navigational warnings and other traffic related information.
- Responding to general maritime enquiries.
- Liaising with vessel owners / operators, agents and other government agents as required.

At 1600 daily, the FIMA Ops Room staff, perform a radio check with the JCR on VHF Ch 10 and 16 to ensure communications are working correctly, as part of their daily handover procedure. Stanley Port Control, from the FIMA Ops room, broadcast the shipping forecast for the FICZ twice daily at 0830 and 1605 on VHF Ch 10. Before the broadcast is made, Stanley Port Control send out an all stations sécurité¹³ broadcast on VHF Ch 16 to advise of a weather broadcast which is about to be made on VHF Ch 10. These broadcasts also include gale warnings and/or any navigational warnings in force.

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Sécurité is a radio procedure word used at the start of a radio broadcast to indicate that important safety navigational information is to follow

1.4 JOINT CONTROL ROOM

1.4.1 Joint Control Room monitoring equipment

The JCR is located at the local police station. There is a designated JCR which is nearly complete, but at the time of the incident, the JCR operators were working in the old Police control room. Staffed by JCRO, these staff are responsible for (in no particular order):

- Monitoring maritime radio traffic and recording traffic entry/exit reports at the reporting line (these duties are carried out from 1630 to 0800 daily)
- Monitoring the 999 telephone system
- General Police enquiries
- Monitoring the Police radios and the local two-metre radio sets.
- Monitoring of other alarms associated with the JCR.

1.4.2 Staffing

There are a total of five full time JCROs and one casual worker who fills in work period gaps as and when required. The Senior Clerk of RFIP also stands in as a JCRO, as and when required. The shift pattern at the JCR works on the basis of five-day shifts (0800 – 1700), three days off, five night shifts (2300 - 0800), four days off and five late shifts (1600 - 2400) and three days off.

1.4.3 Training (Maritime)

The JCROs receive training in the use of marine VHF radios by way of a course of 'Marine Radio Short Range' issued by the Royal Yachting Association (RYA). This training is further supplemented by continual training provided by FIMA. They are also trained in the procedures involved in the handover of maritime radios and reporting procedure for vessels entering and leaving the reporting line. FIMA have also produced a JCR handbook to assist JCROs with their maritime duties.

Between the hours of 1605 to 0800, the JCR monitor the marine VHF radio on channel 16 and 10, under the call sign of '*Stanley Port Control*'.

The JCROs do not have a view of Stanley Harbour or Port William and as such cannot see vessels at anchor or transiting within the harbour. The JCR is fitted with a Sailor Marine band VHF radio which is set to dual watch to listen on both VHF Ch 10 and 16. Ch 10 is the working channel for Stanley Port Control.

Monitoring of vessels in and around Stanley Harbour, Port William and Berkeley Sound is achieved by the JCROs having access to a web browser operated by SURE South Atlantic which overlays AIS targets onto Google Maps. This system is fitted with an audible alarm when vessels cross the reporting line inbound or outbound of Port William or Berkeley Sound. The AIS targets are displayed on an overlaid Google map as a triangle. If a vessel is underway, the target colour will change to either purple or yellow.

When the vessel is stationary with a Speed Over the Ground (SOG) of zero, the colour of the triangle will be grey.

The JCROs are provided with a list of overnight expected movements from FIMA. This list shows the vessel details and their intentions. If the JCROs encounter a vessel which is not on this list, or they are in any doubt, they are instructed to call FIMA on the 24 hour mobile number.

1.6 ANCHORAGE ALLOCATIONS

Prior to arrival at the reporting line, FIMA require all vessels to provide them with notice of arrival for not less than 24 hours in advance. If the vessel is requesting an anchorage, the vessel is then allocated an anchorage at the master's discretion which is very clearly stated that '*the anchorage position is at the master's discretion*'.

The method used for allocating anchorages takes the following into consideration:

- Forecast wind speed and direction
- The draft and size of the vessel requiring an anchorage
- The type of vessel
- Cargo onboard
- Vessel intentions
- Anchorage availability and any other consideration deemed necessary.

FIMA have a procedure for issuing anchorage allocation (Procedure No 6, Anchorage Allocations) which was last reviewed on 30/06/2024. At the time of this accident, all FIMA procedures had been updated as per their annual review of risk assessments and procedures.

SECTION 2 – ANALYSIS

2.1 AIM

The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents occurring in the future.

2.2 OVERVIEW

The *An Fong 168* ran aground in Stanley Harbour after heaving up anchor to execute a 270° turn. Once the vessel started heaving its anchor the force of the wind turned the vessel so that the wind was now on its starboard side and the vessel was unable to turn into the wind away from the lee shore which resulted in the vessel running aground on the southern shore of Stanley Harbour.

2.3 MANOEUVRING CAPABILITY IN THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS

Before the master commenced to heave the anchor, he did not take into consideration the effect that the northerly wind would have on the vessel, which resulted in the Master turning the vessel downwind which increased the overall speed over the ground of the vessel reducing the space the master thought he would have to safely turn the vessel.

No attempt was made by the master to drop the anchor again when the vessel started to quickly close the shoreline.

2.4 COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN LEADING TO FOULED PROPELLER

Although the launch crew were familiar in towing operations, there was a Taiwanese translator onboard the launch who was passing relevant information from the launch to the *An Fong 168*.

The translator passed the message from the launch to the master on the *An Fong 168* and the master acknowledged the message, moments after the tow line was released the *An Fong 168* started its propulsion without checking if the line had been recovered from the water. This action caused the propeller to foul and the vessel to be disabled.

2.5 LAUNCH UNABLE TO PREVENT A SECOND GROUNDING

The harbour launch used to tow the *An Fong 168* from its initial position had been using astern propulsion for a prolonged period to try to pull the fishing vessel from the shore. After the launch had moved away from the fishing vessel once the tow line had been released, the launch was unable to assist a second time due to an overheating engine.

The harbour launch is not designed to pull a grounded vessel of this size off the shoreline. As a result the launch's engines were subject to higher-than-normal loads which caused one of the engines to overheat.

The harbour launch reported its engine defect to Stanley Port Control and stayed at a safe distance away from the *An Fong 168* as the vessel slowly drifted to a second grounding area to the north west of the Public Jetty.

SECTION 3 – CONCLUSIONS

1. The *An Fong 168* ran aground on the southern shore.
2. The equipment used by Stanley Port Control for monitoring traffic within the harbour was not fitted with alarms to notify the watchkeeper if a vessel is running into danger.
3. Both FIMA and the JCR's capability to monitor ships at anchor from their respective offices rely solely on AIS information.
4. There is no tug provision in Stanley Harbour to assist with refloating of grounded vessels.

SECTION 4 - ACTIONS TAKEN

4.1 ACTIONS BY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT

4.1.1 Installation of Harbour CCTV

Since this Accident, FIMA have installed a CCTV camera at Navy Point. This camera provides a much-improved monitoring of Stanley Harbour that did not exist at the time of the grounding. Although there are limitations with this system, FIMA are in the process of further increasing their monitoring capability within Stanley Harbour and Port William and work is already underway with the procurement of this system, working alongside the Directorate of Emergency Services and Island Security.

4.1.2 Issue of Safety Bulletin 02/2026

A Safety Bulletin has been issued by the Falkland Islands Government (Maritime Accident Investigation), to the skippers and officers of squid jigging vessels.

This bulletin highlights the recommendations issued which include:

- Ensuring good communication between bridge and mooring station during anchoring operations
- Skippers understand the effect that prevailing wind conditions have on the vessel and the resultant effect this may have on the maneuvering capability.

SECTION 5 – RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **TUG PROVISION.** There is currently no tug provision in Stanley Harbour. Although there are two very capable tugs contracted to BFSAI, these tugs are at least six hours steaming away from Port William / Stanley Harbour if available. It is recommended that the Falkland Islands Government recognize the risks associated by not having tug provision in Stanley and consider the options for mitigating these risks by facilitating permanent tug availability to cover Stanley Harbour and Port William.
2. **MONITORING.** The monitoring capability of both FIMA and the JCR was limited to AIS monitoring only at the time on the grounding. When monitoring of vessel movements is handed over to the JCR after 1600, this capability is reduced. It is recommended that FIG investigate options on improving remote monitoring of Stanley Harbour and Port William which will benefit both the FIMA Ops Room, and the JCR.